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Cybernetics in the Gallery
Taking place in 1968 at London’s Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA)1 – a 
major node in the network of innovative art institutions emerging in Europe 
at the time – the exhibition Cybernetic Serendipity brought together forty-three 
composers, artists, and poets alongside eighty-seven engineers, doctors, com-
puter systems designers, and philosophers. By exhibiting the work of artists and 
scientists together, without distinguishing them from one another, curator Jasia 
Reichardt sought to interrogate the nature of works of art and of cybernetic arte-
facts. Cybernetic Serendipity was conceptualized less as a traditional exhibition 
than as an “exploration and demonstration of connexions between creativity 
and technology (and cybernetics in particular),” as Reichardt wrote a few years 
after the show.2 She added that it was intended to investigate “the links between 
scientific or mathematical approaches, intuitions, and the more irrational and 
oblique urges associated with the making of music, art and poetry.”3 
With its cunning title, joining “cybernetic” with “serendipity,” Reichardt 
placed the exhibition under the aegis of cybernetic control, on the one hand, 
and chance operations, on the other. In the show’s press release, Reichardt 
made explicit reference to the ideas developed in Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics: 
Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948): 
The term today refers to systems of communication and control in complex 
electronic devices like computers, which have very definite similarities with 
the processes of communication and control in the human nervous system. 
A cybernetic device responds to stimulus from outside and in turn affects 
external environment [sic], like a thermostat which responds to the coldness 
* This essay is a revised, shorter version of a PhD dissertation chapter on Cybernetic Serendipity. See
Adeena Mey, The Cybernetisation of the Exhibition. Experimental Film and the Exhibition as Medium, unpubl. 
Thesis, University of Lausanne, 2018. I wish to thank the editors for their comments and suggestions as
well as Jasia Reichardt for granting permission to reproduce views from the exhibition. 
1 Cybernetic Serendipity, Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, 2 August–20 October 1968.
2 Jasia Reichardt, “Cybernetics, Art and Ideas,” in Jasia Reichardt (ed.), Cybernetics, Art and Ideas, London, 
1971, p. 11.
3 Ibid.
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of a room by switching on the heating and 
thereby altering the temperature. This pro-
cess is called feedback.4
Wiener’s volume, first published twenty years 
before Cybernetic Serendipity, constitutes the 
canonical point of reference in the field he 
helped establish by bringing together – start-
ing with his mathematical work on the devel-
opment of anti-aircraft artillery during World 
War II – a range of scientists concerned with 
issues as diverse as computing machines, com-
munication engineering, biological sciences, 
physics, the brain sciences and psychology, as 
well as anthropology. Recounting his many encounters across these scientific 
communities, Wiener became aware in the mid-1940s, he wrote, of an “essen-
tial unity of the set of problems centring about communication, control and 
statistical mechanics, whether in the machine or in living tissue.”5 As both liv-
ing and nonliving organisms came to be analogously understood as informa-
tion-processing entities – adapting themselves to their environment via the 
mechanism of feedback, thanks to which living and nonliving entities achieve 
a state of homeostasis – cybernetics triggered novel visions of machines (as 
self-learning and self-generating), of nature (as capable of being technically 
engineered and constructed), and of thought itself (models and simulations 
opening the possibility of a machine intelligence). Wiener’s intervention also 
implied that all organisms, living or technical, could be apprehended using the 
same conceptual framework and vocabulary. Consequently, Wiener gave the 
following minimal definition: “We have decided to call the entire field of con-
trol and communication theory, whether in the machine or in the animal, by the 
name Cybernetics, which we form from the Greek κυβερνήτης or steersman.”6 
Although the works presented in Cybernetic Serendipity could by no means 
be entirely subsumed by Wiener’s definition, it was according to just such an 
openly conceived definition of cybernetics that Reichardt was able to mount 
her heterogeneous curatorial assemblage.7 As the press release further stated, 
4 Ibid. The notion of “serendipity” refers to the Persian tale The Three Princes of Serendip (the former name 
for Sri Lanka), which recounts the princes’ constant discovery, always by accident, of things they had never 
looked for. “Serendipity” was henceforth, in 1754, coined by the art historian Horace Walpole to “describe 
the faculty of making chance discoveries.” Quoted in Cybernetic Serendipity (press release), author’s per-
sonal archives.
5 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd edition, 
Mansfield Center (CT), 2013, p. 11.
6 Ibid.
7 In the catalogue (a special issue of Studio International), Reichardt’s introduction is followed by an excerpt 
from Wiener’s The Human Use of Human Being (1950), which Wiener considered the “small popular com-
1 Poster of Cybernetic Serendipity designed by  
Franciszka Themerson 
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“exhibits in the show are either produced with a cybernetic device (computer) or 
are cybernetic devices in themselves. They react to something in the environ-
ment, either human or machine, and in response produce either sound, light or 
movement.”8 One of the main concerns of the exhibition was to present an array 
of works that together brought into question the act of creation by machines and 
humans, so that no visitor would “know whether he [was] looking at something 
made by an artist, engineer, mathematician, or architect” – nor did it matter, 
Reichardt wrote, whether or not one knew “the background of the makers of the 
various robots, machines and graphics.”9 With regard to Reichardt’s statement 
on the modalities of creation and the relative indifference as to the nature of the 
originator of each of the pieces in the exhibition, feedback (between a human 
or machinic organism and its surroundings) seemed to take centre stage as the 
main agent of (artistic/nonartistic) production.10 Indeed, if this undifferentiated 
way of presenting artworks alongside cybernetic devices pointed to a transdis-
ciplinary commitment to asking visitors to reconsider what counts as creativity, 
feedback stood as a nonanthropocentric mode of creative agency that enabled a 
collapsing of the Cartesian distinction between human and automaton. 
Consequently, the exhibition consisted of three distinct sections, each of 
which engaged with a specific modality of this epistemological reconfigura-
tion, ranging from a more conventional understanding of creation to a complete 
reconsideration of aesthetic objects and their appreciation, prompted by the 
cybernetic works. The three sections were as follows:
1. Computer-generated graphics, computer-animated films, computer-com-
posed and -played music, and computer poems and texts. 
2. Cybernetic devices as works of art, cybernetic environments, remote-con-
trol robots, and painting machines. 
panion” to his Cybernetics or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. See “Preface to the 
Second Edition,” in Wiener, 2013 (note 5); Jasia Reichardt, “Norbert Wiener on Cybernetics,” in Cybernetic 
Serendipity. The Computer and the Arts, Jasia Reichardt (ed.), special issue published in conjunction with the 
exhibition, Studio International, July 1968, p. 9. This reference clearly frames the rest of Reichardt’s issue, 
mostly dedicated to various examples of the uses of the computer across media. In this regard, Cybernetic 
Serendipity can be seen as behind developments in cybernetics: the show comes some twenty years after 
the publication of Wiener’s book, 1968 also marking the advent of so-called second-order cybernetics, in 
which the cybernetician Gordon Pask (exhibited in the ICA show) was involved. This designation comes 
from Heinz von Foerster, who defined first-order cybernetics as “the science of observed systems” and 
second-order cybernetics as “the science of observing systems.” See Heinz von Foerster, “Cybernetics of 
Cybernetics,” in Klaus Krippendorf (ed.), Communication and Control, New York, 1979, pp. 5–8.
8 Cybernetic Serendipity (press release) (note 4).
9 Jasia Reichardt, July 1968 (note 7), p. 5.
10 Most relevant here is Michael J. Apter’s question of “why artists have become attracted to some cybernetic 
ideas, like the idea of feedback, rather than other ideas. One cannot help but feel that if the idea of algo-
rithms had been adopted by artists instead, then a quite different, more ordered, more deliberate, kind of 
cybernetic art would have emerged.” Michael J. Apter, “Cybernetics and Art,” in Leonardo 2/3, 1969, p. 263. 
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3. Machines demonstrating the uses of computers and an environment deal-
ing with the history of cybernetics.11
The structure of the exhibition was in itself a testament to a certain will to move 
beyond the art historical and museological conventions of the time, with curat-
ing still largely informed by linear readings centred around authors, schools, or 
national contexts. Instead, for Reichardt, “the main substance of the Cybernetics 
Serendipity exhibition was information – the exhibits themselves consisting of 
objects, diagrams, films and sounds acting as illustrations of the various princi-
ples and ideas of which the information consisted.”12 This definition of the exhi-
bition as privileging information – the latter understood as being embodied in a 
variety of media – essentially established the gallery as a discursive space, and in 
this regard Cybernetic Serendipity foresaw contemporary curatorial experiments 
that deal foremost with concepts, a curatorial genre Bruno Latour has dubbed 
Gedankenaustellung (thought exhibition).13
The thought experiment at work in Cybernetic Serendipity was one testing 
the boundaries between the technical and cultural worlds. As Reichardt put it, 
“whereas new media inevitably contribute to the changing forms of the arts, it is 
unprecedented that a new tool should bring in its wake new people to become 
involved in creative activity, whether composing music, painting or writing.”14 
And as one French reviewer asserted, “generally speaking, these researches 
should result in a merger, highly beneficial for civilization, between technicians 
and artists.”15 In the United Kingdom at the time, much of the debate surround-
ing the relationship between art, technology, science, and the machine engaged 
with the physicist C.P.  Snow’s lecture-turned-book The Two Cultures, in which 
he famously described the divide between science and the arts and human-
ities.16 To some extent, Cybernetic Serendipity can be seen as an attempt to 
11 Ibid.
12 Jasia Reichardt, “Cybernetic Serendipity. Getting Rid of Preconceptions,” in Studio International 176/905, 
November 1968, p. 176.
13 As a philosopher and anthropologist experimenting with ideas through curatorial work, Latour refers to his 
projects as Gedankenaustellungen: “the same way as people talk about Gedankenexperiment [thought exper-
iment],” an exhibition is a “Gedankenausstellung in the sense that it tries to present a problem. It’s a con-
ceptual point.” Bruno Latour and Tomás Sánchez-Criado, “Making the ‘Res Public’,” in Ephemera. Theory 
and Politics in Organisation 7/2, 2007, p. 370. See also Latour’s video conversation with curator Hans-Ul-
rich Obrist in which they discuss Jean-François Lyotard’s seminal exhibition at the Centre Pompidou Les 
Immatériaux (1985) as well as Latour’s Reset Modernity at the Zentrum für Kunst und Medien (2016), URL: 
http://modesofexistence.org/what-is-a-gedankenausstellung (accessed 20 November 2020).
14 Reichardt, 1971 (note 2), p. 11.
15 Anon., “L’ordinateur a-t-il du talent ?,” in Chroniques de l’art vivant 1, November 1968, p. 5. My translation.
16 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, New York, 1959. Edward Shanken notes that this 
issue had already been explored at the ICA in the exhibition Man, Machine and Motion organized by the 
British Pop Art pioneer Richard Hamilton in 1955. See Edward Shanken, Art in the Information Age: Cyber-
netics, Software, Telematics and the Conceptual Contributions of Art and Technology to Art History and Aesthet-
ics Theory, unpubl. Thesis, Duke University, 2001, pp. 74–75.
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refashion or reconcile this gap by actively 
suspending the identification of the 
works on display in such terms. 
Probing the possible cross-pollina-
tions between cybernetics and art in an 
essay in the art journal Leonardo pub-
lished a year after Reichardt’s exhibi-
tion, the psychologist and cyberneticist 
Michael J. Apter identified three ways in 
which cybernetics were of relevance to 
art: first, the “understanding of artistic 
behaviour”; second, “creating works of 
art” through cybernetics; finally “cyber-
netics as art.”17 The first point, which is 
the least important for our discussion, 
relates to cybernetics as a means of shed-
ding light on artistic behaviour whose 
complexity, Apter pointed out, involved 
“control and communication.”18 More to 
the point is the author’s typology of the 
various ways in which cybernetics could 
be used in the production of art, starting 
with “[t]he idea of machines as works of 
art” promoted by cybernetics, since this 
demonstrated “how arbitrary the living/
non-living distinction” was.19 The second 
point refers to the use of “[m]achines 
to create works of art,” which, for Apter, 
included most of the works on display in Cybernetic Serendipity and which he 
saw as representing “a high point in the early development of a self-consciously 
cybernetic art.”20 Apter stressed the shift from a conception of art predicated on 
its objecthood to the notion of “[a]rt as a process,” cybernetics itself emphasiz-
ing processual dynamics echoed in the arts by “the deliberate and creative uti-
lization in some works of kinetic art of the participation of the spectator, i.e. of 
17 Apter, 1969 (note 10), pp. 262–264.
18 Ibid., p. 262.
19 Ibid., p. 263.
20 Among those Apter included in this category were Jean Tinguely’s Metamatic drawing machines as well as 
“computer programmes written to simulate (and even improve upon) the work of the artist,” represented 
in the show by engineer A. Michael Noll’s famous appropriations of Mondrian’s Composition with Lines 
(1917). Noll recoded its visual structure using a “digital computer and a plotter [… ] to produce a semi-ran-
dom picture similar in composition” to its human-made model. A. Michael Noll, “A Subjective Comparison 
of Piet Mondrian’s Composition with Lines 1917,” in Reichardt, July 1968 (note 7), p. 74.
2 & 3 Exhibition view of Cybernetic Serendipity
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feedback between the spectator and the work of art.”21 Deciphering the impact 
of cybernetics on art from what he observed under these three subheadings, 
Apter further noted a “blurring of some of the traditional distinctions between 
the work of art and the system which creates the work of art, and between the 
work of art and the system which observes the work of art.”22 Finally, for the last 
type of relationship identified by Apter, namely “[c]ybernetics as art,” which 
Apter considered the most “intimate” between the two spheres, he hypothe-
sized that cybernetics was “in part, an art form as well as being a science.”23 If 
certain other kinds of science may already have entailed elements that could be 
considered artistic, the novelty of cybernetics was that it appeared to “generate 
art even in its pure science aspects.”24 
“Aesthetically Potent Environments”: Gordon Pask’s Colloquy of Mobiles
Despite his systematic definition of the ways in which the processes and arte-
facts of cybernetics could be considered “artistic,” Apter never mentioned the 
inverse: that art and artists could likewise inform or even be considered as “sci-
entific.” Nevertheless, the blurring of distinctions that he identified between art 
and related systems, as well as his observations about the artistic character pos-
sibly inherent to cybernetics, cogently summed up the conceptual coordinates 
of Cybernetic Serendipity. Among the various conceptual takes on the analogy 
between cybernetic and artistic entities was the cybernetician Gordon Pask’s 
idea of “aesthetically potent environments.”25 Based on his observation of social 
environments characterized by the search for what he called “social communi-
cation, conversation and other modes of partially co-operative interaction” that 
“represent an essentially human and an inherently pleasurable mode of activity,” 
Pask saw aesthetic potency in “environments designed to encourage or foster 
the type of interaction which is (by hypothesis) pleasurable.”26 Proceeding from 
these principles while substantially expanding and complexifying them, Pask 
presented in Cybernetic Serendipity a piece he had described in a “plan” a few 
months earlier as an “aesthetically potent social environment.” A realization of 
one such environment was his Colloquy of Mobiles, an installation of five mobiles 
hanging and moving from a ceiling in one of the ICA galleries. Intended to 
advance possibilities of “artistic communication” and predicated on furthering 




25 Gordon Pask, “A Comment, a Case History and a Plan,” in Reichardt, 1971 (note 2), p. 76. The Colloquy of 
Mobiles resulted from a collaboration between Pask, who designed the system and male mobiles, Yolanda 
Sonnabend, who designed the female mobiles, and Mark Dowson and Tony Watts, who designed the elec-
tronic parts.
26 Ibid.
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(re)activity and participation, Pask conceived of the Colloquy of Mobiles as “a 
group of objects” in which “the individual mobiles that engage in discourse, […] 
compete, co-operate and learn about one another.”27
The Colloquy of Mobiles staged male and female robots in a complex and 
open-ended mating game, the very activation of lights and sounds emitted 
from either the male or female electromechanical beings corresponding to 
movements of “cooperation” and states of “satisfaction” on their part. As Pask 
explained it, “[t]he male mobile has two ‘drives,’ O and P (associated with 
orange- and puce-coloured light) and its drive state is indicated visually by an 
upper display, A. Its main goal is to satisfy (or reduce) the O and P ‘drives’ which 
normally build over time.”28 In this social environment for machines, cyber-
netic individuals engaged autonomously in communication – males and females 
amongst themselves, as well as each individual of a group with members of 
the other gender – the goal being, ultimately, that a female would be “willing 
to co-operate” by producing “an identifying sound in synchrony with the inter-
mittent light signal.” Alternatively, such a “co-operative encounter” would 
end “after a short time if reinforcement [did] not occur, or if it [was] externally 
disrupted.”29 
If its design based on metaphors of drives and sexual satisfaction can be 
regarded as somewhat unsophisticated, the Colloquy of Mobiles was actually a 
rather remarkable apparatus and early experiment with forms of nonorganic 
organization, life, and communication, with Pask conceiving it as a “socially 
orientated reactive and adaptive environment,” in which “[e]ven in the absence 
of a human being, entities in the environment communicate with and learn 
about one another.” The installation was designed to interact with human vis-
itors, who could “enter the environment and participate; possibly modifying 
the mode of communication as a result.”30 Each mobile element could actively 
learn through a form of programmed mimesis, as each time they achieved sat-
isfaction, primary goals and subgoals would become further hierarchized, pro-
ducing new sets of light and sound signals in the pursuit of further goals. On 
that level only, for Pask, could the environment be considered an “aesthetically 
potent” one. But as he further emphasized, “the really interesting issue is what 
happens if some human beings are provided with the wherewithal to produce 
signs in the mobile language and are introduced into the environment,” raising 
the issue of a more literally human-robot sociality and form of communication. 
Pask concluded that: 
27 Gordon Pask, “The Colloquy of Mobiles,” in Reichardt, July 1968 (note 7), p. 34. Footage of the Colloquy of 
Mobiles can be viewed at: https://vimeo.com/26272597 and https://vimeo.com/26271642.
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the mobiles produce a complex auditory and visual effect by dint of their 
interaction. They cannot, of course, interpret these light and sound patterns. 
But human beings can and it seems reasonable to suppose that they will also 
aim to achieve patterns that they deem pleasing by interacting with the sys-
tem at a higher level of discourse.
I do not know. But I believe it may work out that way.31 
As a synthetic, dynamic, and active machine-man social environment in which 
both organic and mechanical beings perform, the Colloquy of Mobiles does not 
belong to either art or science but to the plane of our common sensorium as a 
whole. 
The sociologist and historian of science Andrew Pickering goes so far as to 
claim that Pask’s endeavours in the art world epitomized the formation of an 
entirely new ontological plane he refers to as “nonmodern.”32 Writing about 
Pask’s cybernetic art projects within the field of British cybernetics (which 
included most notably Ross Ashby and Stafford Beer, the latter also a partici-
pant in the ICA show), Pickering claims that the British strand of experiments 
provides us with an alternative picture and understanding of the cybernetics 
traditionally associated with Wiener, John von Neumann, or Warren McCulloch, 
whom he sees as representatives of a modernist version of cybernetics from 
which emerged its identification as a force and form of control and government. 
Hence, in contrast to this modernist tradition, Pickering gives a generic defini-
tion of cybernetics as: “an instantiation of a different paradigm from the one in 
which most of us grew up – the reductive, linear, Newtonian, paradigm that still 
characterizes most academic work in the natural and social sciences (and engi-
neering and the humanities, too) – “the classical sciences”, as Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabelle Stengers (1984) call them.”33 For Pickering, cybernetics as performed 
by Pask and his colleagues ushered a move away from science as understood in 
epistemological and representational terms (prompting, by the same token, sci-
ence and technology scholars to revise the epistemological foundations of their 
work and to operate under what he calls the “representational idiom”).34 Similar 
to Bruno Latour’s conception of “the Modern Constitution” and his call for the 
making of an amodern world,35 Pickering distinguishes two kinds of ontologies. 
The first, the “modern ontology,” conceives of the “material world as passive, 
something that sits around waiting for us, human agents, to represent it (to map 
31 Ibid., p. 91.
32 Andrew Pickering, “Ontological Theatre. Gordon Pask, Cybernetics, and the Arts,” in Cybernetics and 
Human Knowing 14/4, 2007, pp. 43– 57.
33 Andrew Pickering, “Cybernetics and the Mangle: Ashby, Beer and Pask,” in Social Studies of Science 32/3, 
2002, pp. 413–414. Pickering refers to physical chemist Ilya Prigogine and philosopher of science Isabelle 
Stengers’s seminal book Order out of Chaos. Man’s New Dialogue with Nature, New York, 1984.
34 Ibid., p. 414.
35 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge (MA), 1993.
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it, describe it, theorise it, know it).” This image thus implies that “epistemology 
– a meditation on representation – is the only worthy topic for philosophical con-
templation.” In contrast, a “nonmodern ontology” views “the world – human 
and nonhuman – [as] a lively place of performatively interacting and endlessly 
emergent systems (of which we humans are just one sort).”36 For Pickering, Pask’s 
work is an “ontological theatre”37 in which “[e]ach of the robots had its own inner 
dynamics, but [was] open to outside interference,”38 and is paradigmatic of the 
way in which “cybernetics directly thematizes the unpredictable liveliness of 
the world, and processes of open-ended becoming.”39 
Pickering’s view on Pask, and on cybernetics and the arts in general, con-
trasts with other, more negative views of the social, technological and politi-
cal forces associated with cybernetics in the 1960s, which mostly relate it to 
the emergence of what Gilles Deleuze, following William Burroughs, coined 
“Societies of Control,” in which control functions as a permanent, fluid, and 
networked modulation.40 As Deleuze put it, in the former “disciplinary” soci-
eties described by Michel Foucault, “[e]nclosures are molds, distinct castings” 
whereas since the postwar “controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming 
cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve 
whose mesh will transmute from point to point.”41 The apparatuses used by 
Foucault as examples of sites of disciplinary confinement, the “environments of 
enclosure” as Deleuze calls them in his subsequent reassessment, include the 
“prison, factory, hospital, school, family.” In this regard, and to probe Pickering’s 
notion of an “ontological theatre,” it is tempting to discuss Cybernetic 
Serendipity in light of such conceptions of cybernetic modulation, as well as by 
looking at another site that Foucauldian scholarship has traditionally conceived 
of in terms of “environments of enclosure.” Indeed, as Douglas Crimp famously 
put it in his application of Foucault’s analytics in On the Museum’s Ruins: “There 
is another such institution of confinement awaiting archeological analysis – 
the museum.”42 Here the question arises whether Cybernetic Serendipity sig-
nalled the shift evoked by Deleuze, and whether the emancipatory politics of 
Pickering’s cybernetic ontology defined the exhibition as a whole. 
36 Pickering, 2007 (note 32), p. 44. My emphasis. 
37 Ibid., pp. 44–45. Original italics.
38 Ibid., p. 48.
39 Pickering, 2002 (note 33), p. 430.
40 See Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” in October 59, 1992, pp. 3–7. 
41 Ibid., p. 4.
42 Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins, Cambridge (MA), 1993, p. 48.
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Participation and the Cybernetization of the Exhibition
Among the many notable aspects of Cybernetic Serendipity was that the exhibi-
tion constituted a particularly favourable ground for audience participation. For 
instance, the computer graphics artist Peter Milojevic, who participated in the 
exhibition, wrote that “[t]he public at large likes to participate, and is becoming 
more active. We have seen the public choosing the ending of a film, adjusting 
stereo-recording equipment affecting their environment in many ways which 
are new.”43 This notion of an active and participatory subject was not only an 
effect of the open structures of the works, which invited what was an unusual 
behaviour towards them in the gallery, but was also one of Reichardt’s inten-
tions for the show as outlined in her Project for an Exhibition, which included 
“Audience participation” as a specific entry. She elaborated in the document: “It 
is hoped to have a computer or a graph plotter with visual display on the prem-
ises so that the visitors can produce [,] with the help of a technical assistant, 
their own computer graphics. The visitors will also be able to operate the various 
cybernetic devices.”44
In Cybernetic Serendipity, it was clear that the machine-man interactions 
rested not on an essentialist definition of these two kinds of beings, but instead 
offered a pattern for a new type of social, technical, and aesthetic dynamic, 
namely an emerging modality of mediation between objects, viewers, and insti-
tutions and a corollary new mode of spectatorial attention according to the prin-
ciple of feedback in the sense of a system of organized retroactions. If participa-
tion was explicitly put forward as one of the novelties of Cybernetic Serendipity, 
it was also one of its most misunderstood ideas. As Reichardt remarked, there 
was much confusion as to “whether the act of audience participation was sup-
posed to be creative in itself ” and, if so, “should it not produce art as an end 
product.”45 
43 Peter Milojevic, “Some Thoughts on the Art/Computer Relationship,” undated, Papers Relating to the Exhi-
bition “Cybernetic Serendipity,” ICA Collection, Tate Archives, TGA 955/7/2/7. In the exhibition, Milojevic 
showed a series of computer graphics using the Fortran (derived from “Formula Translation”) program-
ming language processed on an IBM 7044. See “7 Designs,” in Reichardt, July 1968 (note 7), p. 94.
44 Jasia Reichardt, “Project for an Exhibition,” undated, Papers Relating to the Exhibition “Cybernetic Seren-
dipity,” ICA Collection, Tate Archives, TGA 955/7/2/7. Frank Popper made a useful distinction as to the 
increasing involvement of the viewer in the art of the 1960s, defining participation as “a relationship 
between spectator and an already existing open-ended art work, whereas the term ‘interaction’ implies a 
two-way related interplay between an individual and an artificial intelligence system.” See Frank Popper, 
Art of the Electronic Age, New York, 1997. Drawing a line between these two modes of active viewership was 
intended to provide a model for the then-growing spectrum of practices that, individually, were unlikely 
to perfectly match Popper’s criterion. Nevertheless, the latter, as media theorist Noah Wardrip-Fruin has 
rightly pointed out, allowed for “a broader definition of artificial intelligence than is traditional in com-
puter science.” See Noah Wardrip-Fruin, “The Construction of Change,” in Noah Wardrip-Fruin and Nick 
Montfort (eds.), The New Media Reader, Cambridge (MA), 2003, p. 127.
45 In this regard, she defined creativity as: “To me creativity does not necessarily result in art or music or 
poetry, and participation has very little to do with creativity but a great deal to do with enjoyment. […] 
What computers do is help people to respond to things. […] In the context of the exhibition the computer is 
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Reichardt embraced the French cybernetician Abraham Moles’s dismissal of the 
“authenticity of a work of art” in favour of the “authenticity of situation,”46 situa-
tions realized, she wrote, thanks to 
the machine [that] is seen in various contexts as a competent assistant 
to man, a conversational companion, a tool, a background against which 
human frustration and hopes are seen in a different light, as a labour-saving 
device, as an instrument for improvisation, as an instrument for amplifying 
happiness and promoting pleasure, as a means of democratizing art, as a tool 
for making art, as well as learning something about how it comes about and 
how it functions.47 
The result of these new forms of behaviour – afforded by the “cybernetic ontol-
ogy” of Cybernetic Serendipity and the symmetrical human-nonhuman agencies 
it presented – was the concrete reshaping of its institutional context in its spatial, 
technical, and material conditions. As I have suggested elsewhere, this process 
relating to a new ontology of the medium of the exhibition might be called the 
“cybernetization of the exhibition.”48 Indeed, Cybernetic Serendipity was con-
ceived as part of a new agenda by the ICA and contributed to refashioning its 
identity as a cultural venue. In a special issue devoted to Reichardt’s show, the 
ICA’s magazine included a one-page description of its new mission, stressing 
its role as a platform for “contemporary art, music, poetry, film, as well as other 
creative realms which are less easy to classify.”49 Demonstrating the ICA’s will 
to embrace culture at large, in whatever forms were yet to come, the text further 
stated that, “[t]oday the ICA activities embrace fields such as pneumatics, pop 
music, cybernetics, electronics and mixed media performances – in the fifties 
it was tachism in painting, new brutalism in architecture and science fiction in 
films. As new possibilities arise ICA has been and will be tackling them.”50
Furthermore, as Michael Kustow (who took up his position as a director of 
the ICA a few months before the opening of Cybernetic Serendipity) pointed 
out, there was in Europe in the late 1960s a “loose network of cooperation 
which exist[ed] between European museums includ[ing] the Moderna Museet 
seen as a neutral tool, so much so that only man’s intentional endeavour brings about some result. Not only 
the computers that had to be programmed, but also machines which functioned solely through the stim-
ulation of the spectator’s presence. Until something occurs physically within the machine’s orbit. It is not 
fully operational. The audience in turn begin to respond to the sound and light of the moving mechanisms 
which they have unwittingly stimulated.” Reichardt, November 1968 (note 12), pp. 176–177.
46 Reichardt, 1971 (note 2), p. 16.
47 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
48 Yuk Hui and Adeena Mey, “L’exposition comme médium. Quelques observations sur la cybernétisation de 
l’institution et de l’exposition,” in Appareil 18, 2017, URL: https://journals.openedition.org/appareil/2413 
(accessed 20 November 2020). 
49 Anon., The Magazine of the Institute of Contemporary Arts 6, September 1968, unpaginated. 
50 Ibid.
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in Stockholm, the Stedelijk of Amsterdam, the Eindhoven museum, the Musée 
d’Art Moderne and the Centre National d’Art Contemporain in Paris, the 
Kunsthalle in Bern, the Akademie der Künste in Berlin, the Tate Gallery and 
the ICA, London.”51 This network was conceived and organized by famed 
curators such as Harald Szeemann, Pontus Hultén, and Pierre Gaudibert who 
sought to develop new types of art institutions that could respond to the artis-
tic and cultural, as well as the social, political, and technological, mutations of 
the 1960s.52 The emergence of such new museums happened at the juncture of 
several factors. First, the necessity to accommodate artistic experiments of the 
1960s whose forms radically questioned the museum’s traditional structure and 
functions. Second, an increasing reflexivity of art institutions towards them-
selves and their social missions, especially in light of the upheavals of the late 
1960s; indeed, as stated by leading curators in a UNESCO report transcribed 
by Szeemann: “We must no longer regard the museum as just an instrument for 
offering art to the public. The museum has become more critical both of art and 
of itself, because it has become aware of its function outside daily life. It does 
indeed function outside the system, sets itself up in opposition to the establish-
ment, yet continually shows itself to be an instrument of the system.”53 Both 
of these factors can be seen as having been cyberneticized, the new aesthetic, 
social, political, and infrastructural imperatives of the museum being recast by 
a broader epistemological transformation towards conceiving of all entities as 
information-processing systems. In the field of cultural institutions, this trans-
formation has resulted in a conception of museums as centres of information 
or communication, one of the effects being a closer involvement of museums 
with research and universities and, at the same time, an increased popularity of 
museums among a general audience.
Covering this mutation of art institutions through series of interviews with its 
main representatives published in the French art magazine Opus International, 
the critic Yann Pavie observed that this emerging culture, “directly confronted 
with daily life […] [,] required the establishment of broadcast centres (centres de 
diffusion),” the latter constituting “the new status of the institution/museum as 
research institute and foundation for creativity.”54 The art historian Jean Clair 
similarly addressed this topic in a 1972 interview with Jonathan Benthall, con-
troller of the ICA. Pointing out the “intellectual sophistication” of the London 
51 Michael Kustow, “Profiles and Situations of Some Museums of Contemporary Art,” in Museum 24/1, 1972, 
p. 48.
52 Pierre Gaudibert, Pontus Hultén, Michael Kustow, et al., “Exchange of Views of a Group of Experts,” in 
Museum 24/1, 1972, pp. 5–32.
53 Ibid., p. 6.
54 Yann Pavie, “Vers le musée du futur : entretien avec Pontus Hultén,” in Opus International 24–25, May 1971, 
p. 57. My translation. The other interviewees in the series included Stedelijk director Edy de Wilde (Opus 
International 27, September 1971, pp.  20–25); Animation-Recherche-Confrontation director Pierre Gaudib-
ert (Opus International 28, November 1971, pp. 26–33); and deputy mayor and head of culture of Vitry-sur-
Seine Jean Collet (Opus International 37, October 1972, pp. 32–37).
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institution whose program at the time of the interview included talks about 
linguistics and structuralism, Clair questioned his British respondent about 
the ICA’s new function, which he saw as akin to that of a people’s university. 
Benthall replied, “what we are trying to do especially, is to help scientists, phi-
losophers, artists, people from all disciplines, confront and integrate their expe-
riences in a more expanded cultural context. What I am simply trying to say is 
that there aren’t two cultures, scientists one on side, and artists on the other, 
there isn’t such a hiatus. […] Culture can be envisioned as a unity.”55 In the dis-
cussion between Clair and Benthall, the idea of a unity of scientific and artis-
tic culture resonated with Snow’s Two Cultures.56 In addition, the editors (most 
likely Clair himself, as he was the chief editor at the magazine) chose to illus-
trate the article mainly with shots from Cybernetic Serendipity. While we can-
not know for sure the editors’ motivation in using these shots, this nevertheless 
points to the undeniable fact that Reichardt’s exhibition, in exhibiting cyber-
netic devices and artworks, was at once symptomatic of and an active agent in 
the process of cyberneticizing the ICA. 
Contemporary to Cybernetic Serendipity’s display of machine-assisted art-
works and to the ICA’s redefinition as information centre were the philosopher 
of science Georges Canguilhem’s writings on the new forms of rationality at 
work in the field of biology. He discussed these through the concept of “regu-
lation,” distinct yet transversal to conceptualizations of organisms in both the 
life and communication sciences. First written as an entry on “Regulation” for 
the Encyclopédie Universalis in 1968, Canguilhem contended that: “Today, the 
concept of regulation encompasses the quasi-totality of the operations of the 
living being: morphogenesis, regeneration of mutilated parts, maintenance 
of dynamic equilibrium, adaptation to living (vie) conditions in the milieu. 
Regulation is the biological fact par excellence. This is the reason why current 
interpretations of regulation processes look for their most expressive models in 
information theory and in cybernetics.”57 Following Canguilhem, it would prove 
very fruitful for exhibition studies to examine the new socio-technical forms 
of the 1960s through the museum as redefined, through the lens of cybernetic 
rationality, in relationship to the biological sciences. This would be another pro-
ject which exceeds the scope of the present article. However, it does reveal the 
circulation of pervasive concepts that have come to inform most strata of post-
war Western society. And although the cybernetization of the ICA did not lead 
55 Jean Clair, “ICA (entretien avec Jonathan Benthall),” in Chroniques de l’art vivant 29, April 1972, p. 15.
56 Ibid. Curator Ben Cranfield has noted that the ICA “aspired to be a ‘laboratory’” and that it even preempted 
Snow’s Two Cultures. Cranfield asserts that the early ICA’s “greatest programmatic goal […] was to bring arts 
and science into closer dialogue.” The author also notes that the ICA was named “Institute of Contemporary 
Art” to distinguish itself from the ideas of both the museum and of modern art. See Ben Cranfield, “It should 
not be to its past that the ICA is beholden, rather the needs of the present and future,” in Apollo, 31 October 
2016, URL: https://www.apollo-magazine.com/past-ica-present-future (accessed 20 November 2020).
57 Georges Canguilhem, “Régulation (Epistémologie),” in Encyclopédie Universalis, Paris, 1972.
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to a programmatic materialization of information theory to the same extent 
as it did, for instance, for the Centre Pompidou, such a process nevertheless 
reshaped its space to the extent that cybernetics became a “hypothesis,” as 
the media philosopher Alexander Galloway put it, following the Tiqqun collec-
tive. On its most general level, Galloway writes, “Tiqqun views the cybernetic 
hypothesis as a new kind of social management involving both human and non-
human assets,” and not “merely limited to a few small scientific fields, but as 
a broad social and cultural ethos with influence across a number of fields and 
practices.”58 
Whether Cybernetic Serendipity embodied Pickering’s version of cybernetics 
as performing “processes of open-ended becoming” or Tiqqun’s conception of 
it as an overpowering force governing all strata of existence, works presented 
in the exhibition, such as the Colloquy of Mobiles, suggested new possibilities 
for interaction between the living and nonliving, possibilities that diverge from 
our contemporary moment with its technological teleology fuelled by artificial 
intelligence and the drive towards systematic automation and prediction. In this 
sense, Cybernetic Serendipity offers a resource for the present by reopening the 
question of serendipity. 
58 Alexander Galloway, “The Cybernetic Hypothesis,” in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 
25/1, 2014, pp. 111–112, 125.
